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IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 
Presidential Address to AARE, Brisbane, I 3 November I 976 
The Australian Association for Research in Education, in the time since its 
founding conference in 1970, has become the principal organisation of educational 
researchers in Australia. The last few years, in particular, have seen its membership 
and attendances at its annual conference grow substantially. Yet it has remained an 
organisation somewhat dominated by those educational researchers whose roots are 
in the empirical research tradition. The majority of papers read at its conferences 
reflect this tradition. Five of its first six presidents would identify with this 
tradition. 
This 1976 conference, through its thematic emphasis on the implications of 
research methods for practice, has provided an explicit invitation for all to display 
their methodological wares and to point to their substantive fruits. Although such 
invitations to reflection often produce protracted sessions of 'navel contemplation' 
in which a succession of speakers bewails the poverty of present research results, 
the inadequacy of present research methodology or the complexity of educational 
phenomena, the hope that many had for this conference was that it would provide 
the grounds for a constructive, and broadly based, review of potential contributions 
and developments. Whether the conference achieves this will obviously be for the 
participants to judge, but the detailed program at least gave promise of it. 
In this address, I make no pretence of judging the contributions of traditions 
other than the one I know myself. What I have chosen to offer is an analysis of the 
prospects for the empirical tradition in educational research. I do this, not to re-
affirm the dominance of this tradition within our organisation, but to facilitate a 
review of it by all members, whatever their own disciplinary or methodological 
affiliation might be. In fact, my objective is even more limited than this might 
suggest. The particular empirical research tradition on which I want to focus is that 
of educational psychology. My intention is to review some of the major shifts in 
emphasis in that tradition, and to offer an analysis of its future prospects. 
THE ORIGINAL DREAMS 
The original dreams of educational psychologists were grand enough! I can distinctly 
recall how, while studying chemistry and psychology as an undergraduate, I was 
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impressed by the grandness of the theoretical vision reflected in Hilgard's (1956) 
text on theories of learning. Hilgard documented the increasing complexity and 
completeness of the theoretical formulations in this area of psychology in a way 
that seemed to give promise of matching, in kind, the formulations that I was 
encountering in the physical sciences. As one having his first experience of the 
behavioural sciences, I was impressed by the prospect of elaborate theories with 
which to account for the phenomena of human behaviour and the prospect of 
applications in the field of educational practice to which I was already committed 
(both by inclination and by contractual obligation). The logical positivism of the 
physical sciences was being clearly expressed as a methodology ofthe behavioural 
sciences. 
My hope, as a fresh young undergraduate in 1960, was certainly consistent with 
the vision of the early educational psychologists but, as I was later to discover, by 
1960 it was already outdated. My subsequent more detailed experiences with 
research on learning from prose materials (McGaw & Grotelueschen, 1972) or 
'connected discourse' as it is called by those who wish to make their activities 
seem more esoteric, and with research on cognitive processing (Anderson & 
McGaw, 1973), have made it clear how much more modest the vision of learning 
theorists is now than it was when Hull was erecting his model (Hilgard, 1956, pp. 
121-184). The information processing model that Professor Gagne offered this 
morning did not seem to me to be based on a claim for comprehensiveness of the 
type that characterised these earlier models. 
After the original investigations of William James (1890), and E.L. Thorndike 
and Woodworth's subsequent series of investigations to determine the bases on 
which the effects of one learning activity might transfer beneficially to another, 
Thorndike (1906) summarised the results in a book entitled Principles of teaching. 
In 1913, he published his three-volume Educational psychology in which he argued 
that the function of educational psychology was to provide 'knowledge of the 
original nature of man and of the laws of modifiability of learning, in the case of 
intellect, character and skill' (1913, vol. I, p. 1). 
Much of the original Handbook of research on teaching (Gage, 1963) reflects a 
similar view of the manner in which empirical research could be expected to 
provide an understanding of educational processes and, ultimately, a basis for more 
systematic and effective educational practice. 
There have, of course, been few who would claim that the grand vision had yet 
been fulfilled. Cronbach (1957), in his presidential address to the American 
Psychological Association, attributed the failure to fulfil the early theoretical 
promise, both in educational psychology and more generally in psychology as a 
whole, to inadequate methodology. In particular, he pointed to the artificial distinctions 
that had been established between the experimental and the correlational traditions 
within psychological research and showed how the separation of these two 
traditions had restricted the theoretical vision of those within each. 
For the experimenters, he said, individual differences had become only a source 
of annoyance, to be controlled or, at least, minimised. For them, it was the 
environmental characteristics, the treatments, that must be manipulated so that they 
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could understand how the treatments operate, on the average. For the 
correlationists, individual differences had become the stuff of life. The treatment 
conditions had to be stabilised, or the effects of their consistencies statistically 
removed, so that they could understand the nature and the extent of individual 
differences. The experimentalist was offering to education the prospect of re-shaping 
the environment to fit best the average child. The correlationist was offering to 
education the prospect of better identification and selection of individuals for 
existing environmental conditions. 
In proposing a synthesis of these traditions through a focus on aptitude-
treatment interactions, Cronbach sought to integrate the experimenter's attention to 
manipulations of treatment with the correlationist's attention to the multi-
variability of responses. For education, the prospect of this broadened research 
would be an ability to determine, for each child, the best situation and, for each 
situation, the most appropriate children. Thus the concept of aptitude-treatment 
interactions entered the literature and became the focus of a good deal of attention. 
Cronbach's (1957) analysis was in no sense a retreat from the ultimate vision of 
theoretical formulations with which to understand human behaviour and on which 
to base educational practice. His paper was a significant attempt to identify more 
precisely the crucial theoretical questions to be addressed and to propose the 
methodology with which to answer them all within a logical-positivist view of 
reality. The answers to be obtained from investigations of aptitude-treatment 
interactions were still expected to provide laws, conceived in positivist terms, and 
conforming to the pattern of laws which have been developed in the natural 
sciences. 
THE RETREAT TO SMALLER VISIONS 
A substantial effort has been invested, since 1957, in response to Cronbach's call 
for investigations of aptitude-treatment interactions. At the same time, however, 
there have been two other responses to the evidence that empirical research in 
educational psychology had failed to have any substantial impact on educational 
practice. Both developments appear to represent a retreat from the grand visions of 
pervasive theoretical formulations and theoretically based practice. One reflects a 
withdrawal from any short-term concerns about practice and a focus on limited 
theoretical formulations. The other reflects a withdrawal from concerns about 
theory and a focus on the task of directly improving practice. The first approach is 
not immediately practical; the second is atheoretical. 
In some ways, the first approach represents little change from the situation that 
Cronbach criticised in 1957. It is characterised by research in which the scope is 
consciously limited, with a few conditions being controlled and the rest being 
ignored. It continues to be a search for main effects, for treatments that work for all 
individuals under certain restricted conditions. 
The research on learning from prose materials, commenced by Rothkopf (1966) 
at Bell Laboratories, can serve as a useful illustrative example. Rothkopf's 
attention was restricted to learning from prose and, more particularly, to the effects 
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on learning of questions inserted in the prose at intervals. Although he interpreted 
his results in tenns of the general principles of operant conditioning, his purpose 
was not the construction of an elaborate theory of learning. His purpose was to 
understand the effects on learning of additions to routine prose materials that might 
control the attention of readers. A large number of studies has followed from 
Rothkopf's original work, many of them done by him and his associates at Bell 
Laboratories. Each study has sought to elaborate a small aspect of the limited 
theory. There is no expectation of grand theoretical propositions flowing from 
these investigations. At best, they are hoped to provide a piece in the jigsaw. There 
is certainly no expectation of any short-term impact on educational practice. Lest 
what I say may seem to denigrate these researchers, let me acknowledge that I have 
myself contributed to this line of research (McGaw & Grotelueschen, 1972). 
In a seminar with graduate students at the 1971 conference of the American 
Educational Research Association, Rothkopf provided an intriguing insight into his 
motivation in developing this line of research. He described a conversation with a 
physicist at Bell Laboratories in which, when Rothkopf complained about the 
complexity of the psychological phenomena with which he had to deal, the 
physicist claimed to be no better off. The physicist pointed to the impossibility of 
predicting which way a rain drop would splash when it hit a roadway but to the 
success with which physical behaviour in vacuum tubes can be predicted. The 
secret, he said, was to work with contrived and idealised situations. Rothkopf's 
selection of prose material at his vacuum tube may have made this an unfortunate 
analogy! 
Note the contrast between Cronbach's exhortations and Rothkopf's practice. 
Whereas Cronbach ( 1957) was arguing for the simultaneous consideration of 
multiple treatment conditions and multiple measures of individual differences to 
accommodate, within a single research design, as much of the complexity of the 
natural phenomena as possible, Rothkopf was seeking more contrived situations 
within which to simulate idealised conditions. But both anticipated the ultimate 
development of positivistic laws of human behaviour. 
To put that another way, Cronbach was seeking more complex versions of the 
traditional empirical research paradigms, whereas Rothkopf and many others were 
seeking more controlled situations within which to apply these traditional paradigms. 
Each anticipated, however, from their research endeavours, the production of general 
laws of human behaviour. 
Still others, however, reject the traditional paradigms as impotent or even 
inappropriate. Stake (1967), analysing the tasks involved in the evaluation of an 
educational activity, proposed the collection of a much broader range of data than 
is usually gathered in empirical studies, while at the same time acknowledging 
that his strategy could not be expected to yield enduring generalisations of the type 
that the empirical research methods were supposed to yield. 
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EDUCATIONAL EVALUATION AS A THEORETICAL PRAGMATISM 
The reactions of Stake (1967) and others in the late sixties to the traditional 
empirical methods seemed to stem clearly from disenchantment with the products 
of the methods. On the one hand, the theory yielded by the rigorous but restricted 
research of those working within self-imposed constraints seemed to offer theoretical 
fonnulations, but only ones which were trivial in the face of the complexities of 
real educational activities. On the other hand, the more elaborate methodology and 
the broader focus of studies of aptitude-treatment interaction seemed to have been 
little more successful in establishing a theoretical base on which to deal with 
educational problems. What was proposed was a complete rejection of the view of 
behavioural research underlying both approaches. The range of legitimate data was 
to be potentially unlimited, but its interpretation was to depend, not upon some 
arbitrarily detennined rules of statistical inference based upon a set of assumptions 
that could not be satisfied, but upon the insight and judgement of the evaluator. 
This approach has won a substantial number of supporters. A new division of 
the American Educational Research Association has been fanned to accommodate 
it. It breeds a kind of pragmatism that focuses directly upon educational practice 
and seeks a basis for the further development of that practice. It makes no pretence 
at hypothesis fonnulation and no claims for generalisability of the findings. 
Improvements to practice in one place may stimulate improvements in another but 
only to the extent that one person's apparently good idea is accepted by another 
who chooses to capitalise on it by amending his own practice. There is no 
expectation of laws that describe enduring relationships emerging from these sorts 
of investigations. 
All this is not to imply that evaluations produce little infonnation. In fact, they 
produce much more infonnation than do traditional applications of the empirical 
research strategies. A major problem is, of course, to establish bases for evaluating 
the infonnation provided through the multiple perspectives used. The evaluator 
seeks a fullness of description that goes well beyond the data provided by the 
typical controlled experiment which seeks to detennine whether some alternative 
treatments are consistently discriminable from one another in tenns of some 
particular outcome measures. Evaluations seek to describe, or portray (Stake, 
1975), the prior conditions of an educational program, the detailed processes that 
occur in its operation and its outcome, both intended and unintended (Scriven, 
1973). Some approaches are more concerned than others with fonnal procedures 
for establishing relations among conditions within the particular program. Whereas 
Stufflebeam et a!. (1971) sought to describe contextual and input conditions and 
processes and outcomes, Stake (1967) proposed a search for contingencies among 
such variables. All approaches draw upon many perceptions ofthe program. None 
places the evaluator in the role ofthe empirical researcher gathering his 'facts'. 
Those writers who demanded these much fuller descriptions, much more 
detailed observations and much more use of insight and judgement unfettered by 
statistical decision-rules have demanded more but, in some respects, offered less. 
Their claims are less pretentious if judged in tenns of what they see to be the 
ultimate products of their enterprise. They have no vision of powerful, explanatory 
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theoretical models towards which to aim. The focus of their attention is in 
developing a more pragmatic strategy for improving (or changing) current practices 
or even just judging current practices. Their models are models of evaluation not 
models of education. In fact, they are less even than that. They are really just 
strategies for evaluation, offering general approaches to the evaluation task often 
without much detailed direction for any would-be evaluator. The details of 
particular evaluations are held to be situation specific in a way that allows of no 
description of a generalisable and detailed methodology. 
In contrast with the traditional commitment, in educational research, to the 
development of theory, the evaluators have abandoned the theoretical vision not 
because it seemed too difficult but because it seemed unhelpful in the face of 
pressing problems of practice. It is not clear from much of their writing whether 
this reflects an expedient view that theoretical models are too remote to be worth 
pursuing at this stage, or a more theoretical stance in which such models are held to 
be ultimately unattainable or inappropriate. Whichever is the case, there is a 
general rejection by evaluators of strategies that claim to accumulate wisdom in the 
form of generalisable formulations of theoretical relationships among educational 
variables. 
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS 
In the last I 0-15 years it seems to me that educational psychology has been 
moving in the three fundamentally different directions that I have outlined. Some 
researchers have employed the more powerful methodology to which Cronbach 
pointed in the hope of building broad theories, others have concentrated on more 
restricted aspects of theory in the expectation of subsequent integration with other 
components, while a third group has abandoned any focus on theory in favour of a 
more immediate atheoretical attack on the problems of practice. 
We are now, in the mid-seventies, in a position to make some judgements about 
the relative successes of these approaches. 
With respect to the research on aptitude-treatment interactions a good deal of 
evidence is now in and has been extensively reviewed (e.g. Bracht, 1970; Cronbach 
& Snow, 1969). Cronbach (1975), in his address on receipt of the Distinguished 
Scientific Contribution Award at the 1974 conference of the American Psychological 
Association, reflected on the present state of the research activity he had stimulated 
seventeen years earlier and reached some intriguing conclusions. In his earlier 
analysis he had said that the results of the relatively independent traditions of 
research on the effects of treatment differences, on the one hand, and the nature of 
individual differences, on the other, were confused because they failed to take 
account of the interactions between individuals and treatments. In his more recent 
reflection, he pointed to some studies that show clear-cut interactions of the type 
predicted. 
For example, experimental comparisons of didactic teaching methods and 
problem-solving methods, which had been inconsistent in the earlier research, had 
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now shown the problem-solving methods to be superior with a middle-class 
clientele but the didactic methods to be superior with lower-class children. 
Cronbach (1975) also pointed to inconsistencies in the studies of such 
interaction, inconsistencies that he suggested are themselves due to higher order 
interactions. To illustrate this with a hypothetical example, suppose that the 
teaching method by social class interaction just described, that is, the differential 
effectiveness of teaching methods with different social classes, actually interacted 
with the content of the instruction. For example, the superiority of didactic methods 
with lower class children may appear with science instruction but not social 
science. Investigators unaware of this crucial content variable would be faced only 
with the inconsistency with which they have have been interacting between 
teaching method and social class. The problems are how to anticipate the factors 
that will cause such higher-order interactions and how to collect enough data with 
which to study them. 
The position that Cronbach took on this in 1975 is intriguing. Remember that, in 
1957, when confronted with inconsistencies in the results of studies of overall 
treatment effects, he proposed a new set of questions about interactions and a more 
powerful methodology with which to deal with them. In 1975, with evidence that 
the important questions are even more complex, he proposed no further stepping up 
of the methodology. Instead, he proposed a scaling down of our expectations of 
educational research. 
Because of the problems of anticipating potential sources of higher order 
interactions, Cronbach argued for a careful attention to the detailed conditions of 
each study and a complete description of them. Exceptions to any generalisation 
could then provide the clue to the sources of higher order interactions. But how are 
these exceptions to be fitted into any pattern? Once a potentially interacting factor 
has been identified, it is possible to design a study in which the higher order 
interactions can be investigated empirically but there are two problems. Firstly, 
there is no basis for estimating the likely significance of an interaction from an 
observed exceptional case and so no way of knowing how much value there may 
be in pursuing it. Secondly, the amount of data required to study the interaction 
may be prohibitive. What we need is a more effective way of synthesising the 
results that suggest the need for this type of further investigation. 
One potentially powerful approach has recently been developed. In his 
presidential address at the American Educational Research Association earlier this 
year, Gene Glass ( 1976) outlined an empirical approach to what he called meta-
analysis. Meta-analysis, in contrast with primary analysis of original data or 
secondary analysis of existing data, is an analysis of analyses. Typically, meta-
analysis has been done by literature review. It often proceeds like literary criticism. 
It occasionally takes a more empirical form when the number of related studies 
with significant and insignificant results are counted to see which outcome is 
dominant. Such a voting procedure usually reveals some studies for and some 
against and produces a general feeling of despair about the whole enterprise of 
empirical research in education. Glass suggested that these approaches to synthesis 
are so inadequate that we end up 'knowing less than we have proven' (1976, p. 46) 
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because we fail to put it all together, so to speak. What Glass proposed is a more 
thoroughgoing empirical approach to synthesis. He described how related studies 
could be assigned numerical descriptors that indicate both design characteristics 
and the magnitude of the effects revealed in their data. Relatively complex analyses 
of variance could then reveal the strength of any overall conclusions as well as the 
presence of interactions of the type that Cronbach felt could not be studied directly. 
Glass's (1976) procedure seems to me to hold promise of carrying us beyond an 
impasse that Cronbach (1975) revealed. 
To illustrate his approach Glass took 1000 studies from the confused literature 
on the outcomes of psychotherapy and counselling (much of which literature 
suggests that 'nothing' is as good as 'counselling', that is that counselling is no 
better than nothing). His complete analysis, based on 375 studies, quantifies 
differences between types of counselling in ways that none of the individual 
studies attempted. It is an elegant empirical synthesis of the confusing results of a 
large number of empirical studies, which finally offers the therapists grounds for 
confidence in their activities denied them by the classical literature reviewers. It 
estimates the magnitude of the superiority of therapy overall and provides 
empirical comparisons of the efficacy of different approaches to therapy. 
Now where does that leave us? Can we find in Glass's empirical approach a 
procedure for confronting the questions that Cronbach thought were answerable? 
In part, I believe, we can. But Cronbach pointed up another problem that may, 
indeed, be more serious. He suggested that time itself may be an important factor 
with any of our data. Results obtained at one time may simply not recur at another 
time because of changed circumstances. Our conclusions may be less enduring 
than we have hoped for, our laws less stable. Indeed, it may be inappropriate to 
think of them as laws. Cronbach himself in 1975 lowered his sights to a short-term 
empiricism, a set of relationships among explanatory concepts that are generalisa-
tions only in the sense that they serve as working hypotheses at a particular time. 
He has rejected the model of the physical sciences, which, he believes, has 'fixed 
our eyes on an inappropriate goal' (1975, p. 126). 
We would do well to be chastened by Cronbach's experiences and to be more 
modest in our expectations. But we may be able to go further than he suggests. We 
may not break free from our time-bound generalisations but, with Glass's (1976) 
meta-analysis, we may be able to broaden the basis of our generalisations within 
that frame. 
That then appears to be where the research on aptitude-treatment interactions 
has taken us and where it might lead, but what of the research directed to more 
limited theories and the pragmatic attention to practice? The controlled studies of 
limited psychological phenomena may build cumulatively on one another in a way 
that research on more complex aspects of educational practice cannot. They may 
give rise to a better understanding of particular aspects of human behaviour but I 
have no expectation of a thoroughgoing science of human behaviour and I see no 
evidence of an empirically based educational theory constructed upon what 
psychology presently offers or will offer. To believe that educational phenomena 
can be understood in terms of psychological phenomena alone is to indulge in a 
42 
PROSPECTS FOR THE EMPIRICAL TRADITION IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 
reductionism that does no justice to the educational phenomena. To understand 
learning or development, or even their interaction, for example, is not to 
understand teaching. It is with respect to the psychological phenomena themselves 
that Cronbach (I 975) no longer hopes for more than short-run empiricism. With 
respect to educational phenomena, it is unrealistic to hope for more! 
Kallos and Lundgren (1975) argue that education ought to be considered lawful 
only in the sense of being rule-governed. They suggest that we should seek to 
establish the contextual conditions in which participants opt for certain sets of rules 
rather than others. We ought not to presume that there are underlying laws, they 
saw, expressed in terms of hypothetical, psychological constructs, with which to 
account for teaching behaviour, but only that there are external system constraints 
that influence conscious decisions made by teachers. Without necessarily going as 
far as this in rejecting completely the potential value of positivistic laws, it does 
seem clear that we need to distinguish educational research from psychological 
research and that we need to recognise the limits within which our methodology 
can operate, indeed, the limits imposed by our methodology. 
As for the atheoretical attention that has been given to practice, there seems to 
be no basis for teaching general conclusions about its value. Scriven ( 1969) and 
Stufflebeam ( 1975) have discussed, in some detail, a basis for meta-evaluation, but 
I know of no documentation that reports the effectiveness of various approaches to 
evaluation in influencing practice. The commitment to evaluation seems still to rest 
on a general hope that it will achieve what research has not. Whether revealing to 
participants in an educational activity the perceptions of other participants, and 
perhaps even their own, will lead to changes judged by any or all of them to be of 
value is to my mind completely unknown. 
THE ULTIMATE GOAL AND THE IMMEDIATE TASKS 
Presumably, there is unanimity about the ultimate goal of empirical research in 
education being the improvement of educational practice. But what are its 
prospects? It seems to me that fundamental psychological research should not be 
conducted in the name of educational research and that whether it yields enduring 
or, at least, useful generalisations about psychological phenomena ought to be the 
only criterion by which it should be judged. Those pursuing atomistic 
psychological research with this in view, however, should consider seriously the 
caution issued by Cronbach (1975) before, or as, they press relentlessly on in their 
pursuit of models fashioned on those of the natural sciences. 
For those who are concerned with educational practice, I believe a legitimate 
case can be made for several courses of action. Some may choose only one; others 
may choose simultaneous advances along more than one for their own professional 
satisfaction. The remoteness of much ofthe more theoretical research from practice 
and the pressing nature of many practical problems justifies, in my view, serious 
attention to the empirical evaluation of practice, but I harbour a concern that it 
offers no ultimate promise of progress. Unless the wisdom from isolated 
experiences can be accumulated each new set of practical decisions will be made 
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from as much ignorance as the previous. Empirical investigations of the influence 
of contextual constraints on conscious choices take us a step further by helping 
those educators in a position to manipulate the context but, unless these educators 
know which choices are to be preferred, they in tum will be manipulating in 
ignorance. In that context, I mean choices that could be made on the basis of their 
utility in achieving goals, not normative choices that must be made among goals. 
As much as this research on the effects of constraints on choices, we need 
research on the effects of choices. We do not need to achieve that our conclusions 
will be immutable over time to justify such research. What we need is sufficient 
fidelity to the complexity of the context for us to be able to isolate the conditions 
crucial to the effect. We need not demand that every research study control or 
systematically vary the universe of conditions but we should demand that each 
documents the conditions in which it was conducted. With this sort of detail, we 
can apply the insight and judgement of which Cronbach (1975) spoke as well as 
providing the basis for empirical syntheses of the type that Glass ( 1976) provided. 
I believe that there are regularities in the phenomena we study. Too often we 
seem to see only the complexity and retreat either to contrived situations from 
which we hope to have removed the complexity or abandon altogether our faith in 
the regularity and pursue the specific as though they were nothing more. And if all 
that sounds like an attempt to legitimate what I have been doing for the last eight 
years, it probably is! 
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